William Colby: OSS, CIA Director
William Egan Colby (January 4, 1920 – April 27, 1996) spent a career in intelligence for the United States, culminating in holding the post of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from September 1973 to January 1976. During World War II Colby served with the Office of Strategic Services. After the war he joined the newly created Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Before and during the Vietnam War, Colby served as chief of station in Saigon, chief of the CIA’s Far East Division, and head of the Civil Operations and Rural Development effort, as well as overseeing the Phoenix Program. After Vietnam, Colby became director of central intelligence and during his tenure, under intense pressure from the United States Congress and the media, adopted a policy of relative openness about U.S. intelligence activities to the Senate Church Committee and House Pike Committee. Colby served as DCI under President Richard Nixon and President Gerald Ford and was replaced with future president George H.W. Bush on January 30, 1976. Author: Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA.
The Man Nobody Knew: In Search of My Father, CIA Spymaster William Colby is a 2011 American documentary film exploring the life and career of former CIA director William Egan Colby. His son Carl Colby narrated and directed it; David Johnson produced. Narrated by Carl Colby, son of the late Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby, The Man Nobody Knew traces the elder Colby’s career in the U.S. intelligence community, along with and in contrast to his home life, including the secrets he kept from his family. The film begins with Colby’s service in World War II as an officer and paratrooper with the OSS, and follows his rise through the Central Intelligence Agency, where his roles included political covert action to oppose the Communist Party in Italy, later counterinsurgency actions and involvement in the 1963 coup in South Vietnam (in concert with President John F. Kennedy) during the Vietnam War, and later as Director of Central Intelligence in the 1970s. During his brief, tumultuous tenure leading the agency, Colby revealed the existence of documents describing illegal activities by the CIA, known as the “Family Jewels”, in an effort to reform the agency. The film concludes with Colby’s disappearance and death in April 1996. Trailer.
William Colby: Not Afraid of American Public
“He was a creature of Washington. You know you look around the world these days, especially America; and they are so contentious. People are at each others throats. I still feel that Washington is a place where people talk to each other and you can have Donald Rumsfeld and Patrick Leahy maybe in the same room, once in a while. I think he wanted to live in that world, where we could have discourse and maybe disagree, but really come up with the best solutions to today’s problems. … He’s not afraid of the American public. Patrick Leahy I interviewed him, and he said ‘What are we Americans afraid of, in terms of determining policy?” – Carl Colby
– CSpan: Q & A: Carl Colby.
Barbara Colby: Where is the Rationing Sacrifice for the War Effort?
“I think it’s my mothers indomitable spirit. She’s World War II generation. I’ll give you a little insight. I didn’t put it in the film but while I interviewed her [Barbara Colby], we were talking about Iraq and Afghanistan; and she said ‘Where is my sacrifice? What am I being asked to do, where is my part in this war. If we are at war, give me something to do, and maybe I should ration; or maybe I should go and visit the VA hospital or wrap bandages. If I am part of this, where is my sacrifice?’. – Carl Colby; CSpan: Q & A: Carl Colby.
William Colby: Wisdom of Seeking Win Win Negotiations Problem Solving
“The new weapons are more dangerous to the possessors, much more, and that’s why I think it is essential that we stop this mad race in this thing. The race is unwinnable. You cannot win it, because whatever you do, he counters. The weapons are unusable. Unilateral restraint won’t solve anything; and the world we are headed toward is unliveable, resting on a fragile suspicion base, which must be responded to in matters of moments; if we see the wrong signals. … Our general staff decided we need small accurate [MX missiles] one’s and so we built small accurate ones. The Soviets built allot of big ones and so suddenly we say well, we need big ones, cause they have big ones. Not because we need em, but because they have them. That’s a kind of adolescent reaction: he has a bigger baseball bat, so I need a bigger baseball bat. … The Scowcroft Commission looked into the [MX missile] thing and they said it was dangerous and not very valuable, but they said we should build it to show national will and determination. I think there are lots of better ways to show national will and determination than to building useless and dangerous weapons. That doesn’t show much wisdom, it may show national will and determination; but I’d rather show some wisdom with it. [What would be actions of wisdom?] Well reaching across to the Soviets and indicating that we perceive their fears and concerns and insist that they understand our fears and our concerns, and negotiate with them, not from a point of view of one-upping them, but from a point of view of seeking out a relationship, that will be beneficial to both sides, that will save both sides useless and even dangerous activity. [How do you accomplish this? We’ve had three treaties in the past two decades signed by both presidents, but not ratified by the Senate and Congress] Well there you put your finger on how to accomplish this. Either through a particularly brilliant leader, or by pressure from the base, from the population as a whole. … At the moment we really have to have our own negotiating proposals looked at. President Raegan did not realize that his initial negotiating proposal would have required the Soviets to eliminate something like 3/4 of their landbased system; and wouldn’t have affected ours much at all. Now, if our leader does not realize what the impact of his proposal on the other side is; you don’t have a negotiation. You’ve got to think it out and work out a negotiation, that does recognize the concerns of the other side. So that’s the first thing to develop a proper negotiating procedure. They have certainly told us what they are concerned about. …. Out of that realization as to what concerns each side, one can construct negotiations which give a reasonable balance. This does not mean they will immediately accept it. They are very tough, hard bargainers; and sometimes their bargaining is very negativist; and is really not seeking a solution. But then as in any contract negotiation that we all go through, even when we buy a used car, you give a little to get him to come towards you. Thats the nature of the negotiation, there’s nothing unique or mysterious about it, you are just trying to make a deal. … The intelligence business is the country’s mechanic to investigate’s your used car and sees whether its any good or not, before you buy it. And we investigate after we’ve bought it, to make sure its stays good. [A second way that you have indicated that wisdom can be shown is about bringing about necessary social and economic change in countries that are at risk around the world.] That’s not so much a Soviet problems, that deals with the other problem of our national security. Now we receive millions of people in our country every year, as refugees as migrants and so forth. Now we’re not going to solve that by putting up barriers, at our borders. The way in which we are going to solve that, is to get the economies of those countries, particularly in the lands to the south of us, booming so that they have jobs and hope there, and don’t have to come here to seek their livelihood. Now that I think is a move toward our national security. [At one point you informed Soviet leader Brezhnev that the more we know about each other, the safer we will be, what were you hoping he would understand.] Well I was hoping that he would understand that that is the real function of intelligence today, to clarify on both sides, misunderstanding.
– [Bold EoP Amended] Quest for Peace: William Colby.
Military Gospel: CIA
“Investigation [of the science of war consequences of nations living in accordance to a Masonic War is Peace international law social contract that allows for the nations citizens to procreate and/or consume above ecological carrying capacity limits] shows that whenever two nations have become engaged in warfare they have been advancing on converging lines of [resource acquisition for growing consumption or procreation] self-interest and aggrandizement. When the contact takes place, the struggle for supremacy, or even survival is at hand. This inevitable hour is approximately fixed and determined by the angles of convergence plus the sum of the relative [consumption / breeding war] speed by which the nations are moving along their respective lines. Thus it is that, when the angle of [breeding / consumption war] convergence of both or even one of the nations is acute and the speed or progress along one or both of the converging lines correspondingly great, war results in a few years or decades.” – [EoP Amended] Homer Lea, Valour of Ignorance;
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